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UKRAINE'S 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: 
A SPATIAL ANALYSIS1 
The article is devoted to a metric multidimensional spatial analysis of the 1999 Ukrainian 
presidential election. Using data from a nation-wide pre-election poll, we estimate the spatial 
positions of the eight leading candidates along with respondent ideal points in that same space. 
Our conclusions are that although we see the same substantive issues reflected in these estimates 
as in the 1998 parliamentary contests (nationalism and attitudes toward market reform), and 
although, again as in 1998, both the Western and Eastern halves of the country agree largely in 
their perceptions of the candidates' relative positions (with the usual and expected biases in 
overall preferences), the spatial recovery here seems considerably less «stable» than in 1998. 
We also find differences in candidate relative positions that seem inexplicable in terms of the 
substantive issues that dominated the 1998 contests. We attribute these differences to the fact 
that in 1999, respondents relied to a far greater extent than they did in 1998 when evaluating 
the alternatives before them on factors other than «spatial issues» — notably, the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the candidates. 
There are two competing conceptualizations for 
nearly any election. In the first voters are seen as 
basing their decisions largely on the personal char­
acteristics of the candidates — their reputations for 
honesty, their image as competent administrators, the 
intangibles of personality, ethnic identification, and 
so on. In the second view, although voters my not 
be seen as concerned with specific issues or a co­
herent ideology, they are presumed to be motivated 
by a combination of the two — a combination in 
which they see themselves and the candidates as fa­
voring liberal or conservative policies, as favoring 
further government intervention in the economy or 
less, or as being pro-labor or pro-capital. Their as­
sessments may be retrospective or prospective, but 
in this second view it is generally convenient to con­
ceptualize voters as mapping their issue preferenc­
es, along with the candidates or parties they confront 
in an election, into an «ideological» or criterion 
space — a spatial model — that orders an otherwise 
complex political universe for them [8]. A consid­
erable literature has developed, moreover, that em­
ploys this conceptualization to model elections in 
order to understand the general strategic imperatives 
that operate on candidates and parties, to theorize 
about the consequences of imperfect information 
within electorates, and to assess the implications of 
alternative way of aggregating votes into final out­
comes (see, for instance, [4, 5, 6, 11]). 
Of these two views, we might reasonably assume 
that the first will better describe elections when vo­
ters must chose from among a list of specific indi­
viduals as in a presidential contest, when the parties 
associated with those candidates are ill-formed as in 
a newly emerging democracy and voters must rely 
on a candidate's personal characteristics rather than 
established party platforms, or when, because of the 
evolving and ephemeral nature of parties, party la­
bels and the organizations they represent are more 
closely associated with well-known personalities 
than with any discernable and historically based ide­
ological position. The second conceptualization, in 
contrast, normally best fits parliamentary contests, 
especially those that entail party lists and proportion­
al representation, where the campaign focuses on 
issues rather than the foibles of specific individuals, 
and where the parties themselves have established 
platforms that can be described, even if in only some 
vague way, as pro- or anti-business, pro- or anti-
labor, pro- or anti-some specific ethnic group, and 
so on. In this instance the personal character of can­
didates is submerged beneath party labels and the 
ideological content of those labels. 
Between 1998 and 1999 Ukraine's electorate 
appears to have experienced both types of elections. 
Although announced on relatively short notice so that 
several «parties» could form and offer lists for the 
PR component of the contest only a few months be­
fore the actual balloting — indeed, could be labeled 
a party only in the loosest sense of the word [12] — 
the 1998 parliamentary contest also involved parties 
with some history, including the Communists, the 
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nationalist Rukh, and a spin-off from the old Com­
munist party, the Agrarians. The 1999 presidential 
election seemed a sharp contrast. One established 
party, Rukh, split and in effect offered two candida­
tes (Hennady Udovenko and Yuri Kostenko), the in­
cumbent, President Leonid Kuchma, disavowed any 
party attachment, one opponent, Yevhen Marchuk, 
had been Kuchma's Prime Minister and former first 
vice-head of the KGB in Ukraine, and although the 
Communists had their official candidate (Petro Simo-
nenko), the field was crowded with several fellow 
travelers, including the head of the Socialist Party 
and former parliamentary speaker Olexandr Moroz 
(the same Moroz that later linked Kuchma to the 
death of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze) and the cur­
rent speaker Olexandr Tkachenko. Adding to this 
mix was Natalia Vitrenko, who advocated rolling 
reform back to a pre-Stalinist era after splitting from 
Moroz's party, proclaiming that he and his party (and 
others) had «sold out to the West and the IMF» and 
strayed from true Marxist-Leninist principles. 
An earlier spatial analysis of Ukraine's 1998 
parliamentary elections based on a national sample 
of respondents revealed a reasonably coherent two 
dimensional structure that corresponds closely to the 
second conceptualization of electoral competition 
[7].2 Briefly, the first dimension mapped the parties 
between left and right, pro-versus anti-market re­
form, and, owing to the correlation of attitudes within 
the electorate, also captured attitudes towards rela­
tions with Russia. The second dimension, while cor­
relating somewhat with the first and upon which the 
parties showed little variation (with the exceptions 
of the United Social Democratic Party, USDP, and 
the Social Democratic Party, SDP), served largely to 
differentiate among those respondents who favored 
reform yet remained ardent Ukranian nationalists 
versus those who favored reform but held a «rela­
xed» attitude toward Russia, relations with Russia 
and the use of the Russian language in everyday and 
official discourse. Interestingly, this third constella­
tion of opinion — pro reform and a relaxed attitude 
towards Russia — seemed, at least in the minds of 
our respondents at the time, under-represented by the 
primary contending parties. Although, judging by the 
recovered spatial positions of the parties and the 
electorate's estimated distribution of preferences in 
that space, both the SDP and USDP appealed some­
what to this part of the electorate, the positions of 
both parties seemed too far to the left (Communist 
and Socialist-Peasants Party) so that no party suc­
ceeded in taking full advantage of this potential 
source of electoral support. 
Our analysis revealed several additional patterns 
in the preferences and perceptions of respondents. 
First, although respondents in Eastern Ukraine were, 
on average, more conservative economically and 
politically than their Western counterparts (hardly a 
surprising result), a separate analysis of respondents 
from East and West revealed the same basic spatial 
map, the same recovered relative configuration of 
parties, and approximately the same functional form 
for the distribution of respondent ideal points. Thus, 
although there is a clear ideological difference be­
tween East and West, both halves in 1998 at least 
viewed politics through the same conceptual lens. 
Respondents in the separate parts of Ukraine may on 
average have had different preferences, but they eval­
uated matters in terms of the same issues and saw 
their electoral alternatives using equivalent concep­
tual schemes. Second, the overall distribution of es­
timated respondent ideal points «covered» the issue 
space and the recovered positions of the candidates 
relatively uniformly, without specific clusters at any 
one point or region (see Figures la and lb in [7], 
p. 157). Thus, we have a picture here of an electo­
rate with a «normal» distribution in both the statis­
tical and normative senses. And finally, although the 
accuracy of its predictions could not match a simple 
question such as «if the election were held today, for 
whom would you vote?», a prediction of the vote 
share for the ten most competitive parties based on 
the estimated spatial positions of the candidates and 
ideal points of respondents closely approximated 
(within a few percentage points) the eventual vote 
distribution across parties. 
This paper reports on a parallel study applied to 
the 1999 Ukranian presidential election so that we 
can see what constancy there is in the that electorate 
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son's ideal and that position. Utility, in turn, is meas­
ured by the answers given to questions that allow a 
respondent to grade each candidate along some scale 
that varies from strong approval to strong disappro­
val. In 1999 respondents were queried about eight 
candidates — Vitrenko (VIT), Kostenko (KOS), 
Kuchma (KUC), Moroz (MOR), Marchuk (MAR), 
Simonenko (SIM), Udovenko (UDO), and Tka-
chenko (TKA) — who together accounted for 92.5 % 
of the vote,5 and two questions in particular are suit­
able for analysis using a spatial methodology: 
Ql: I will ask you about some candidates. To 
what extent would you be satisfied or dissatisfied 
if won the election? 
1. Extremely unsatisfied 
2. Almost fully not satisfied 
3. Mostly not satisfied 
4. More unsatisfied than satisfied 
5. Difficult to say 
6. More satisfied than unsatisfied 
7. Mostly satisfied 
8. Almost fully satisfied 
9. Extremely satisfied 
The second question addressed the «issue» of 
Ukraine's relatively rough transition to a democra­
tic market economy — a transition that has brought 
few benefits to large sectors of society and, at the 
same time, seems to have left the country in econo­
mic and political disarray: 
Q2: How would you estimate the ability of to 
put the country in order? 
Very low 
Low 
Mostly low 
Rather low than high 
Difficult to say ... neither low nor high 
Rather high than low 
Mostly high 
High 
Very high 
Of course, not all respondents graded every can­
didate and in many cases voters failed to differenti­
ate among all or most of the candidates. Following 
procedures equivalent to those used to analyze the 
1998 parliamentary data, we proceed as follows: 
First, after eliminating all respondents who failed to 
grade at least one candidate, if a respondent failed 
to grade a particular candidate, that candidate was 
assigned a score equal to the average of all scores 
given to graded candidates by the respondent in 
question. Thus, if a respondent only graded two can­
didates with, say, scores of 3 and 7, the remaining 
5
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First, Simonenko and Udovenko's supporters take 
opposite positions on the issue of Ukranian relations 
with Russia, whereas those respondents who indicate 
an intention to vote for Kuchma or Marchuk are 
closely matched and on average take a moderate 
position on relations but the more liberal position (in 
the classical sense) on the state's role in the econo­
my. And unlike the separation we see between Vit-
renko and Moroz in Figures la and lb, in Figure 2 
their supporters are closely matched. 
Although we shouldn't confuse the disparate 
nature of the preceding figures — Figure 2 is sim­
ply a summary of voter opinions on two specific 
substantive issues whereas the candidate positions 
portrayed in Figures la and lb are the product of a 
procedure derived from a formal model of voter pref­
erences that allows candidate positions and voter 
ideals to be estimated from a more general and not 
necessarily issue-specific evaluation of the candi­
dates. However, methodology aside, we should ask 
how we can reconcile these seemingly disparate re­
sults? To begin, then, consider Figure 3a, which 
graphs the 973 estimated voter ideal points using 
Question 1, and, comparing this figure to Figure la, 
notice the clear clustering of ideals around the spatial 
positions of Vitrenko, Simonenko, Tkachenko, Moroz 
and Marchuk. Otherwise, ideal points are distributed 
in a «cloud» with Kuchma near or at its center. 
There is a ready explanation for this clustering 
of respondents. Specifically, these are respondents 
who rank one candidate the uniquely worst possibi­
lity (scoring that candidate a 1) and who rank another 
uniquely the best. However, the lower the score of 
the «best», the further will be that respondent's esti­
mated ideal from the candidate's estimated spatial 
position. Thus, since these clusters correspond nearly 
identically to candidate positions,7 we can get some 
sense of the proportion of the electorate who gave 
the candidate they ranked «best» (usually someone 
other than Kuchma, Udovenko, and Kostenko) a high 
score such as 8 or 9. Interestingly, we see a slightly 
different pattern with respect to Q2, which pertains 
to bringing order to the country. Although the pri­
mary clusters here are essentially identical to what 
we see in Figure 3a, notice the small cluster of ide­
als in the lower left corner of Figure 3b. This clus­
ter corresponds to a set of respondents who in fact 
gave Kuchma the worst possible score (=1 on Q2), 
but, while uniquely favoring Simonenko, neverthe­
less gave him a less than enthusiastic ranking (e.g., 
5 or 6). We have here, then, a set of respondents — 
admittedly small — who rank Simonenko quite high 
in terms of the satisfaction they would have derived 
had he been elected, but who at the same time do not 
score him high on the likelihood that he can bring 
order to the country. And interestingly, none of the 
7
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other candidates appears to possess a base of core 
supporters with these divided attitudes. 
2. Interpreting the Dimensions 
The preceding discussion does not help us ex-
plain the differences between Figure 2 and the spa-
tial maps offered in Figures la and lb. Indeed, Figu-
res 3 a and 3b raise the question as to why the so 
many respondents are clustered around Vitrenko and 
Moroz's positions, yet appear to hold similar atti-
tudes on questions Q3 and Q4. However, notice that 
thus far we have not attempted any substantive in-
terpretation of the dimensions in our spatial recov-
ery. To that end, then, we can reexamine questions 
Q3 and Q4, and in particular, see how respondents 
with different ideal points answered these questions. 
Thus, using Ql as the basis of our estimate of re-
spondent ideals, Figure 4a graphs the mean ideal 
point of those respondents who answered l(n = 239), 
2 (n = 226), 3 (n = 293), and 4 or 5 (n = 167) to ques-
tion Q3, while Figure 4b graphs similar means for 
those who answered 1 (n = 170), 2 (n = 515) or 3 
(n = 267) to question Q4. 
ciently that there is, in effect, but a single issue — 
essentially a diagonal line running through the space. 
This story is repeated, moreover, if we consider the 
respondents' attitudes towards Ukraine's general per-
formance and their position in it. Here we have two 
questions to consider: 
Q5: To what extent are you satisfied or not satis-
fied with the current situation in Ukraine? 
Q6: To what extent are you satisfied with how 
your life is going. 
1. Absolutely not satisfied. 
2. Rather not satisfied than satisfied. 
3. Rather satisfied than satisfied. 
4. Fully satisfied 8. 
Figure 5 graphs the mean ideal points of the re-
sponses to these questions, and as we can see, this 
figure is a near replay of Figures 4a and 4b, with re-
spondents at or near Simonenko's position being the 
most dissatisfied with Ukraine's current circumstanc-
es and their own quality of life. 
Neither the mapping of the ideal points with re-
spect to questions 3 and 4 or questions Q5 and Q6 
Both figures tell essentially the same story: Spe-
cifically, the means on both issues correlate suffi-
are surprising, but the implication of Figures 4a, 4b 
and 5 together is that there is essentially a single 
«issue» in Ukranian politics — or rather that there 
are many issues, but that they correlate sufficiently 
highly in the minds of the electorate as to make po-
litical competition nearly unidimensional. This is not 
to say that one candidate or another cannot, with 
some skill and effort, untangle these issues so as to 
divide and «pick off» elements of their opponents' 
support. But thus far, for one reason or another, none 
of the candidates in the 1999 presidential contest 
appears to have been successful in doing this, al-
though the dispersion of Vitrenko, Moroz, and Mar-
chuk from the line connecting Kuchma and Simo-
nenko (which corresponds roughly to the lines shown 
in the preceding three figures) suggests that at least 
these three candidates have, with some minimal suc-
8
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cess in the minds of the electorate, attempted such a 
strategy. 
This overall unidimensional character to the is­
sues is, in fact, close to what we observed with re­
spect to the 1998 parliamentary contest. Figure 6 
reproduces the recovery of party positions in that 
election, and shows, with the exception of the USDP 
and SDP, the parties lined up on essentially a single 
dimension. This dimension, in turn, correlates high­
ly with the same substantive issues addressed by 
questions Q3 through Q6, with one exception. Spe­
cifically, as we note earlier, the second dimension in 
1998 usefully distinguished between respondents 
who prefer a relaxed attitude towards relations with 
Russia versus those who do not, whereas here, in our 
1999 data, we fail to detect any such issue within the 
electorate. This is not to say that respondents who 
prefer a continuation of reforms do not differ in their 
attitudes towards relations with Russia, but only that 
they apparently saw no alternative among the presi­
dential candidates that allowed them to differentiate 
according to such a criterion, in which case that cri­
terion would not appear in the analysis. Thus, al­
though his comment pertained more to the controver­
sy swirling around the death of journalist Gongadze 
and the response of the Kuchma administration to it, 
Arel's ([1], p. 59) comment that «democracy, econo­
mic reforms, and national identity in Ukraine are sym-
biotically linked» applies as much to the electorate's 
perception of things as anything else. 
What remains a puzzle, however, is both the dis­
persion of the candidates on two dimensions as com­
pared to the parties in 1998, and the difference be­
tween the recovered positions of the candidates and 
Figure 2. Here, however, we can begin to gain in­
sight into both matters by considering the mean es­
timated ideal points of voters (using question Ql) 
who support the different candidates. Briefly, on the 
basis of the question «if the election were held to­
day, for whom would you vote» Figure 7 portrays 
these eight means and reveals an interesting fact. 
Specifically, notice that although the mean positions 
of the supporters of six of the candidates corresponds 
approximately to the recovered positions of those 
candidates (Kuchma, Vitrenko, Simonenko, Tkachen-
ko, Kostenko and Udovenko), the mean ideal points 
of Moroz and Marchuk are moved considerably. In 
particular, Marchuk's supporters are close to Kuchma 
whereas Moroz's supporters would have him distance 
himself somewhat from Simonenko and Tkachenko. 
We can only speculate as to why the (mean) po­
sitions of the supporters of these two candidates are, 
unlike those who indicate an intention to vote for 
someone else, different from the candidates them­
selves. The hypothesis we offer is that respondents 
are evaluating candidates on the basis of some non-
spatial considerations in addition to spatial ones. In 
particular, it seems reasonable to suppose that a sub­
stantial share of respondents who support Marchuk 
are doing so not because of some perceived issue-
based difference between Marchuk and, say, Kuch­
ma, but because they dislike Kuchma. Marchuk's 
supporters, in other words are little different from 
Kuchma's in terms of attitudes towards reform and 
Russia, but they nevertheless grade Kuchma low on 
questions Ql and Q2 for reasons other than these 
policies, thereby pushing Marchuk out in the recov­
ered spatial representation of candidate positions that 
Figures la and lb report. Indeed, the 55 supporters 
of Marchuk in our sample give Kuchma an average 
score on Ql of 2.3 — lower even than the score they 
give to Moroz and on a par with the score they give 
to Udovenko (see Table 1). Indeed, 24 of them, or 
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nearly half, award Kuchma the lowest score possi-
ble on this question. Similarly, Moroz's support is, 
to a certain extent, a midway point between the 
avowed Communist party candidates, Simonenko 
and Tkachenko, and those candidates at least unop-
posed to a continuation of the reforms. Once again, 
however, a dislike of Kuchma among these respond-
ents moves Moroz out and closer to Simonenko and 
Tkachenko in Figures la and lb (the average score 
they award Kuchma on Ql is 2.0 — the lowest av-
erage score they give to any candidate) — with 32 
of 68 awarding him the lowest score of 1. 
The sizeable gap between Vitrenko and Moroz 
in Figure 7 as well as Figures la and lb is a bit more 
difficult to explain, especially in light of Figure 2, 
which places these candidates near each other. Again, 
however, we need to keep in mind the inherent com-
plexity of our multidimensional scaling algorithm. 
The correlation between scores for these two candi-
dates is near zero (.09), which means that our statis-
tical methodology has some freedom in terms of their 
placement relative to each other. But here we should 
note that despite the similarity in Moroz and Vit-
renko's supporters on questions Q3 through Q6, 
Moroz's supporters, perhaps remembering her defec-
tion from his party, on average score Vitrenko only 
slightly better than Kuchma (2.3 versus 2.0) and oth-
erwise lower than all other candidates. We can also 
speculate that Vitrenko's advocacy of some genuine-
ly extreme positions, including if necessary a forced 
resurrection of Marxist ideology within Ukraine, left 
many respondents at a quandary as to how to score 
her, in which case an overall pattern of scores on 
questions Ql or Q2 dissimilar from any other can-
didate would cause the algorithm to move her away 
from all candidates. Respondents did tend to see her 
on a par with Simonenko, Tkachenko and Moroz in 
terms of her con-
servatism; yet she 
presented the elec-
torate with a suffi-
ciently «distinct» 
platform (to say 
the least), that it 
would be impossi-
ble to locate her 
near any of these 
candidates, regard-
less of her sup-
porter's preferenc-
es on specific pol-
icies. As we shall see in the next section, some sup-
port for this supposition is provided by looking at 
Ukraine's western and eastern parts separately. 
3. Regional Variation 
If we look back once again to our analysis of the 
1998 parliamentary election survey, we see that de-
spite the apparent ideological differences between the 
westerns and eastern halves of Ukraine on the issues 
of reform and relations with Russia, respondents in 
both halves saw the parties and issues in the same 
terms. That is, if we recover the issue dimensions and 
party positions after separating respondents by ge-
ography, we get essentially identical spatial maps, ex-
cept that the mean preference of respondents differed 
in both samples in the expected way — respondents 
in the East were closer to the spatial positions of the 
C o m m u n i s t , 
Socialist-Peas-
ant, and Agrar-
ian parties than 
were respond-
ents in the 
West, whereas 
those in the 
West were gen-
erally closer to 
Rukh, the PDP, 
Hromada and 
NEP. Figures 
8a and 8b re-
port that the 
same similarity 
in evaluative 
criteria applies to the 1999 Presidential contest.9 
There is, of course, some variation: the East puts Si-
monenko and Tkachenko at nearly the same point but 
appears to differentiate between Kostenko and Udov-
9
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enko, whereas the 
West does the op­
posite.10 Owing to 
statistical errors, 
however, these dif­
ferences are unim­
portant." 
Ukraine's East-
West divide can be 
seen in a different 
way insofar as re­
spondents themsel­
ves are concerned. 
First, if we calcu­
late the percentage 
of ideal points closest to each candidate (eliminating 
Tkachenko), we get the results shown in Table 2.12 
Table 2. Percent of ideals closest to each 
candidate 
Thus, we see Kuchma's considerably greater strength 
in the West, as compared to Vitrenko, Moroz and Si-
monenko's strength in the East, and twice as many 
ideal points are closest to Simonenko among re­
spondents living in the East as compared to the West. 
These differences, moreover, are reflected in the 
distribution of ideals within each region. Figure 9 
graphs the mean estimated ideal point for each of 
Ukraine's 26 regions and shows the separation be­
tween East and West parts of Ukraine. Indeed, if we 
draw the convex hull of the means of the Eastern 
oblasts, only two Western regions fall into it — with 
the most «imbedded» case being Cherkasskaya ob­
last (which in fact is Central one). And if this oblast 
is excluded, then only three Eastern regions fall into 
the convex hull of the Western oblast means. Al­
though one can hardly be surprised by such results, 
it is clear that the East-West divide that has charac­
terized Ukranian politics in the past [2, 3, 10] not 
only persisted through the 1999 presidential contest, 
but that there is little evidence of its erosion. 
Before concluding, there is one additional obser­
vation that we might offer with respect to Figures 8a 
and 8b. Specifically, recall our conjecture that nei­
ther the Communist electorate nor Kuchma's sup­
porters considered Vitrenko a viable alternative. And 
indeed, notice, when we compare her position in 
these two figures, we can see that, in the East, she 
is moved away from Simonenko, whereas in the West 
she is moved away from Kuchma in the direction of 
Simonenko — almost as if the supporters of Simo­
nenko and Kuchma are «pushing» her into the op­
posing camp. Earlier, in fact, we noted the enmity 
that appears to exist among Moroz's supporters with 
respect to the scores they give Vitrenko. However, 
we can also say that there seems to be more «push­
ing away» on the part of Vitrenko's supporters as an­
ything else. Looking back again at Table 1, which 
10
 The recoveries are equivalent in another sense as well — the percent variance accounted for by the eigenvalues of each 
dimension. In the case of the East, these percentages are, from the first to the third dimensions respectively, 81%, 7% and 4% whereas 
for the West they are 78 %, 7 % and 5 %. 
11
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differences between these orientations and Figure 1 owing to the rotational ambiguity of a spatial recovery. Thus, although Figjres 
4a, 4b and 5 tell us something about the substantive content of the dimensions in Figure 1 since ideals and candidate positionsderive 
from the same recovery, these three figures cannot be applied to Figures 8a and 8b, since rotations vary. 
12
 Notice the considerable over-estimation of Kuchma's actual vote and the under-estimation of Simonenko's and Moroz's. Of 
course, after having eliminated respondents who failed to score more than one candidate as well as those who indicated that they 
would not vote, there is no reason to believe that our sample is, except in the broadest sense (in the sense of telling us howthe electorate 
generally perceives the election) representative for predictive purposes of the electorate as a whole. 
13
 Note that the percentages recorded in «overall» are not simply the average of those reported for East and West. Each column 
is based on its own separate recovery of the candidate positions and voter ideals, with Overall using all data, East only those voters 
in the eastern oblasts, and West only those in the western oblasts. Estimation error will cause estimates from the combined sample 
(Overall) to differ from any average of the two separate subsamples. 
14
 As a percentage of the vote received by these eight candidates. 
15
 We should note here that our methodology does tend to over estimate the vote share of the candidate serving as pivot. 
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reports the overall average score respondents gave 
each of the candidates among the supporters of Vit-
renko, Kuchma, Simonenko, Marchuk, and Moroz, 
notice that although Simonenko's supporters give Vit-
renko an average score only slightly less than Moroz 
and Tkachenko, Vitrenko's supporters do not fully 
return the favor — although they give Simonenko a 
score that is equivalent to what she receives from his 
supporters, the support her «voters» give to Moroz and 
Tkachenko drops off considerably. Kuchma's support­
ers, on the other hand, inexplicably score Vitrenko on 
a par with Kostenko, Marchuk and Udovenko, which 
thereby allows our spatial methodology to move her 
closer in the direction of Kuchma, especially among 
Kuchma's supporters, than we might otherwise sup­
pose by looking at the scoring reported by Vitrenko's 
support. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in both the 
Eastern and Western halves of Ukraine, Vitrenko ap­
pears to be something of an outsider not merely be­
cause of her positions, but also because of her some­
what unusual ability to impress people that she be­
lieves her own words and her promises. 
4. Conclusions 
The preceding «explanation» for Vitrenko and 
Moroz's positioning in our spatial maps, and our 
earlier discussion of the apparent inconsistency be­
tween Figure 2 and Figures la and lb, suggest that 
the responses to questions Ql and Q2 are picking up 
something other than the respondents' preferences on 
issues and their evaluation of the candidates on them. 
Specifically, it suggests that the personal character­
istics of the candidates — characteristics that need 
not have a component to them directly measured by 
any question in the survey — played a role in peo­
ple's evaluations of the candidate that was not pre­
sent in the 1998 election. This is not to say that is­
sues such as Ukraine's relations with Russia or the 
pace of economic reform diminished in importance 
between 1998 and 1999, but only that voters used 
criteria in addition to these issues when judging each 
candidate's qualifications as president. 
What makes estimation difficult here is that we 
cannot exclude the possibility that different voters 
might employ wholly different additional criteria. 
Our methodology assumes that although respondents 
might hold different preferences, they all operate in 
essentially the same criterion space. However, it is 
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reasonable to suppose that, for example, some re­
spondents saw Vitrenko as an outsider by her posi­
tions, others evaluated her by her public speaking 
skills, and still others evaluated her differently sim­
ply because she was the only woman in the field. 
Similarly, we can only guess at how those respond­
ents who supported Rukh in 1998 judged Kostenko 
in light of his role in the fracturing of that party. 
Rumblings of corruption swirled around Kuchma's 
administration even before recent post-election 
events dominated the headlines, although it is admit­
tedly difficult to say how much blame they assigned 
to Kuchma versus the belief that all politicians are 
inherently corrupt. The fact is that there are any 
number of «issues» voters might use to evaluate can­
didates — «issues» that concern only subsets of the 
electorate, that are applied to only a subset of can­
didates, and which need not map into a single issue 
so as to yield a spatial interpretation. Our guess is 
that unlike the 1998 parliamentary contest, in which 
party positions «made sense» with respect to the is­
sues, the 1999 presidential election combined the two 
conceptualizations of elections outlined in the intro­
duction to this essay. Voters chose on the basis of 
issues that have concerned Ukraine since the disso­
lution of the Soviet Union and even before. But at 
the same time, they also allowed their evaluations of 
candidates to be affected by some non-spatial crite­
ria. The sharp divergence in Kuchma's scores on 
question Ql between his supporters and those of his 
opponents reported in Table 1, and which account for 
his spatial placement outside the convex hull of the 
positions of other candidates, almost certainly can­
not be wholly explained by such substantive issues 
as Ukraine's national identity and his position on 
economic reform. Those scores also reflect the our 
respondents' assessments of his personal qualities. 
This, of course, is only normal in a society in which 
the candidates' partisan attachments are weak or non­
existent, in which the differences between them are 
often too subtle to be appreciated by anyone except 
political insiders, in which the electorate generally 
believes that no one has the will or means to pull the 
country out of its economic morass, and in which the 
candidates themselves compete on the basis of per­
sonality, reputation, and the ostensible inadequacies 
and personal deficiencies of their opponents. 
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Хініч М., Хмелъко В., Ордешук П. 
ПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКІ ВИБОРИ 1999 РОКУ 
В УКРАЇНІ: ПРОСТОРОВИЙ АНАЛІЗ 
Стаття присвячена метричному багатовимірному просторовому аналізу 
президентських виборів 1999 р. в Україні. З використанням даних загальнона­
ціонального передвиборного опитуванння оцінюються просторові позиції вось­
ми головних кандидатів та ідеальні точки респондентів у тому ж самому про­
блемному просторі. Зроблено висновок, що хоча в цих оцінках відбиті такі ж 
основні проблеми, як і під час парламентських виборів 1998 р. (націоналізм 
і ставлення до ринкових реформ), і хоча знову, як і в 1998 p., сприйняття 
відносних положень кандидатів у західній і східній частинах країни значною 
мірою збігаються (при звичайних та очікуваних відхиленнях у загальних пріо­
ритетах), просторове відображення тут видається значно менш «стабільним», 
ніж у 1998 р. Виявлені також такі відмінності у відносних позиціях кандидатів, 
що залишаються непоясненими в термінах основних проблем, які домінували 
у виборах 1998 р. Зроблена спроба пояснити ці розбіжності за рахунок того, 
що у 1999 р. набагато більшою мірою, ніж у 1998-му, при оцінці альтернатив­
них кандидатів респонденти враховували скоріше не «просторові проблеми», 
а інші чинники, особливо — специфічні характеристики кандидатів. 
